There they shot all five execution-style in the backs of their heads.
The Carr brothers drove Befort's truck over the bodies and left them for dead. survived her head wound at the soccer field because her plastic barrette deflected the bullet.
In order to substantiate his claim, he focused on the 1920 jailhouse defense in Independence, Map 5. (Map by Erin Greb.) 118 chapter 5 an incident that precipitated a race riot. did Kansas finally put an end to vigilante justice targeting blacks.”3 This book rejects Lovett’s interpretation of the history of black resistance to lynching in Kansas.
“After these events in Independence,” Lovett mistakenly asserted, “no further attempts were made to lynch an African American in Kansas.” Although it was unclear whether armed black resistance could have prevented the Alexander lynching, he concluded that the trajectory of militant self-defense in Kansas was clear: “Only later, once it became commonplace for African Americans to collectively protect black suspects . In fact, black Kansans had never ‘sat idly by and watched members of their race become victims.’ For at least forty years before the Independence incident, they had prevented lynchings with jailhouse defenses indistinguishable from that one—minus the riot. to protect criminals in their own race any more than any other race, but it is their sworn determination to uphold at all hazards the law.” Another added that “the sooner negroes demonstrate to the world that they love their race as well as any other nationality and will willingly die for the right, this lynching business will cease.” In 1897 a black paper in Wichita addressed the means: “When it comes to the lynching business, a number of Winchesters in the hands of determined men are essential adjuncts to prayer.”4 In addition, blacks succeeded because they were often well organized.
Befort had intended to propose to Holly, and she found this out when the Carrs discovered an engagement ring hidden in a popcorn box.
After the search, the Carrs forced their hostages to strip naked and then bound them.
Those who have addressed successful acts of resistance against lynching have largely focused on a few vignettes which in their paucity reinforce the notion that lynchings were inexorable.Furthermore , they have relied heavily on the state-by-state lynching lists published by the Chicago Tribune, by such institutions as the Tuskegee Institute, and by academics—lists that further reinforce the inexorable force thesis because they tabulate only completed lynchings.“Events can be theoretically comprehended as coherent historical happenings only by grasping the sum total of their unfolding sequences,” noted Larry Griffin, Paula Clark, and Joanne Sandberg in explaining their model of lynchings-in-themaking . is entirely a function of the precise sequences of actions constituting the event and how they unfolded through time.”2 By chronicling lynchings-in-the-making in addition to completed lynchings, this study finds that white Kansans threatened at least eighty-seven lynchings between 18; they completed only nine (see map 5).was a spree of random robberies, assaults, rapes, and murders perpetrated from December 7 to 14, 2000 by brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr against several people in the city of Wichita, Kansas.In this period, the Carrs killed five people and a dog in the course of robberies and assaults, robbed another man, and severely wounded a woman.The brothers broke into a house chosen nearly at random where Brad Heyka, Heather Muller, Aaron Sander, Jason Befort and his girlfriend, a young woman identified as "Holly G.," all in their twenties, were spending the night.They were all working adults; Befort was a local high school teacher, Heyka a director of finance with a local financial services company, Muller a local preschool teacher and Sander a former financial analyst who had been studying to become a priest. The Carrs initially scoured the house for valuables.During one such operation in 1899, a participant explained that “it is not the intention of the negroes . They developed an informal but effective communication network so as to alert the black community to a crisis. In Argentine in 1899, for example, the Daily American Citizen reported: “Whether the lynching rumor was true or false, in less than two hours from the time the report was circulated every Negro home in a radius of five miles, that contained a male Negro, had heard the same.” In 1904 defenders in Kansas City “blew a horn as a signal,” noted the Wyandott Herald. “The final identity of a lynching-in-the-making as either a completed or a prevented lynching . Plainly, it asserts that lynching was anything but a ‘spring-release trap.’ In his study of the Alexander lynching in Leavenworth, historian Christopher C.Lovett argued that, thereafter, black Kansans “no longer sat idly by and watched members of their race become victims of vigilante justice.” With this argument , he implied, of course, that blacks had never intervened before.